religious experience and shifting defeater standards (contextualism?)

I just finished reading Kierkegaard's (or Johannes Climacus') Philosophical Fragments yesterday, and the work offered some interesting insights about religious experience and a person of faith's relation to historical evidence of Christ's incarnation, resurrection, etc. 

One idea that struck me was that Climacus thinks that since the condition of faith is necessary for anyone to believe in a positive historical account of Christ, then negative historical accounts (i.e., historical evidence contra Christ's incarnation, resurrection, etc.) hold absolutely no relevance for the person of faith.

This move seems prima facie an overreach. Even though faith is not ultimately grounded in historical evidence, it's at least informed in some way by historiography. After all, how would we know what the person of Christ is like if we are utterly without the historical accounts of the gospels? Further, if every historian came out today with near conclusive evidence that Christ did not resurrect, does this honestly not have any implications for our faith?

Here, we can perhaps shift Climacus' relation to historical evidence in the following way. Climacus thinks that the object of faith is something that transcends historical evidences because faith is less about a historical event happening than a personal encounter with the God whom a person places faith in. This is why Climacus can claim every person, regardless of where they live in history, is a firsthand witness to Christ rather than a secondary or tertiary one. It is the religious experience of encountering a person that seals the person of faith from historical critiques against Christ.

Climacus has one notable contribution to religious epistemology: religious experience confers a kind of deep credence for faith that is much harder to defeat by way of other arguments (e.g. a negative historical account). But Climacus has to concede at some point that even the most seemingly real experiences are technically open to defeaters--although these would have to be very, very strong defeaters.

So, for the sake of argument, let's posit a credence level at which it's appropriate for a person to assent to a belief: .7. This would mean that it's appropriate to assent to beliefs that are much more likely true than false. I take it that a defeater defeats a belief once it reduces a person's credence level below the appropriate level of belief, such that if the person continues to hold the original belief after acquiring the defeater, they're acting irrationally. Maybe this story is false, but remember that this is just for the sake of argument.

It seems like some beliefs are qualitatively distinct from others in this regard. For example, if I had the sensory experience of viewing my phone's weather app, and I consequently form the belief that it's 70 degrees outside, my world will not be turned upside down if someone corrects me in saying that it's actually 70 degrees outside, and I had read the number wrong. 

But suppose I had formed the belief that I have had a father for the past 22 years, and a psychologist comes along and tries to defeat this belief by saying that I've actually projected an illusion of a father, when in reality, I was born in a lab such that I do not have a father. The standard of defeat for my original belief in my father's existence seem to need to be exponentially higher than those of my belief in the weather. 

So it might be with religious experience: perhaps a person without a religious experience and also believes in theism might have a much lower standard of defeat than a person with the same belief and a religious experience. I think this is likely the case.