The view from nowhere in moral philosophy

C. Stephen Evans has a recent article in the newest edition of Philosophia Christi that is called "The Revolt against Accountability to God." His argument is as follows: 

There is something called a "global hermeneutical perspective" (GHP) that has emerged from philosophers like Nietzsche, which holds that every person--hence, 'global'--has ulterior motives (e.g. Nietzsche's 'will to power' or Freud's 'masters of suspicion') that influence them toward interpreting the world in accordance with these ulterior motives. For example, if Nietzsche were alive today, he would likely see the recent renaissance of Christian philosophy as an enterprise by which the church is trying to control the academy. Plantinga and Swinburne might say that they're honestly convinced by the arguments they put forth, but the GHP holds that there's good reasons to doubt this.

Evans thinks GHP is translated neatly into a Christian view of subjectivity called the "no-neutrality thesis" (NNT). Inspired largely from the work of Kierkegaard, Evans thinks that original sin causes every human person to rebel against the authority of God that they were made to respect. Thus, NNT also holds that there is an ulterior motive--namely, a desire for a person to be their own source of moral authority and consequently not be held ultimately accountable for their actions--within every human person, such that their beliefs are are heavily influenced by this condition. 

While Evans is not out to make an ad hominem, he does think it's curious that the NNT exists, that many moral philosophers are moral antirealists--i.e., that moral facts do not exist independently from persons, and that they're in some way emergent from our own experience--and that the majority of philosophers do not believe in God. Of course, some philosophers might be genuinely convinced by their arguments, but even atheist moral philosophers such as David Enoch (although Enoch is a realist, he still considers his view to be nontheistic) and Gilbert Harman concede that many philosophers are less concerned about the coherence of their arguments and more with keeping together a worldview they're already committed to. 

So, what do we do with Evans' argument here? He ends the article by referencing Nietzsche. Nietzsche always gets a bad rap in analytic circles because he typically does not make an argument for his worldview; rather, he just asserts his worldview and describes what life is like within it. How is it that a philosopher who is known for not making positive, constructive arguments for his worldview rise to such prominence in our world today? Evans thinks the answer lies in the fact that the worldview he's constructed is deeply attractive to Nietzsche's readers. Thus, Evans ends with a hope that Christian thinkers might be able to develop a similarly attractive worldview. 

I think Evans' argument is true: people are typically much more committed to supporting their worldviews than their arguments for them (even if this distinction might be tough to make). This is why I think the push for cultural apologetics is a fruitful endeavor, since many people do not understand the beauty of what the Christian worldview entails. In regard to the virtue of accountability in moral philosophy, I suppose the endeavor might be constructive a vision of a life lived-welled because, at least in part, they had the virtue of accountability in some way. Even as a prominent analytic philosopher, Evans is write to assert that people are likely more attracted to beautiful worldviews than rigorous (albeit, correct) arguments.