Cuneo's Normative Web of Epistemic and Moral Facts

Terence Cuneo recently did an interview in which he surveys just about every one of his major publications here: https://316am.site123.me/articles/normative-webs-thomas-reid-and-liturgy?fbclid=IwAR1DfUDIZW79Ej0HE_MhstInxre-fdkvj6p1zubs9vv41clf-g7H1-FVofI. I am deeply influenced by Nicholas Wolterstorff's work, and I think of Cuneo as a younger Wolterstorff protege (and hence, I'm becoming a big fan of Cuneo's work as well). Here is a fascinating argument he makes in his Normative Web. It goes like this: 

(1) If moral facts don’t exist, then neither do epistemic ones. 

(2)But epistemic facts exist.

(3) Therefore, moral facts exist.

Clearly, the most controversial part of this argument is the condition in premise one. I don't think it's worth taking time to defend (2)--unless we're willing to do away with epistemic norms such that any proposition need not satisfy any kind of conditions for justification or rationality.

So, what to do with (1)? Well, my only exposure to Cuneo's argument is in this interview, and he does not take much time to flesh out a comprehensive case for why this is so, but I think the reasons for (1) can be expressed rather easily.

What is a moral fact? Cuneo presumes they're real; that is, similar to abstract objects, they actually, really exist. Depending on whether or not you think these facts possess a latent ability to produce obligations upon persons within them or if they require some personal agent with the appropriate authority, most who think real moral facts exist think they have obligations upon persons that require normative constraints on the way persons should act. 

Now, how do we know about such facts? Again, Cuneo does not take too much time to flesh this out, but e we can safely assume he endorses a Reidian 'common sense' epistemology that might be similar to Plantinga's externalist 'proper functionalism' or Huemer's 'phenomenal conservatism.' We can probably presume that whatever standards of epistemic justification in regard to our knowing of certain moral facts, they're either quite minimal or just have to do with believing in seemings in the absence of a sufficient defeater.

So, when a person is prepared to reject the existence of real moral facts, they have two options: a) they can endorse an antirealist view of moral facts or b) they endorse a radical kind of skepticism. Cuneo has independent refutations of antirealist views of moral facts for a), and also independent arguments for skeptic epistemologies (i.e. expressivism and nihilism) in the interview that are worth reading. 

I like this argument because I have interests in both epistemology and meta-ethics, but I was somewhat confused on how I could bridge them. Great interview!